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Introduction
Stability is an essential requirement for political systems; however it is known
that most political institutions are unstable. In this paper we study the
structure of instability of power systems. A system enters into instability
when it is submitted to contradictory forces that prevent any outcome from
being established in such a way that commonly accepted institutions work
normally. However, no matter how harmful it may be deemed for the viabil-
ity of collectivities, instability is not necessarily a course of chaotic actions
and events that obey no law: the main thesis of this paper is that there are
patterns of instability.
Many countries present the property of being politically split over two
main issues. History and geography are accountable for this bipolarity. The
main issues can be of socioeconomic type, or of ethnic or religious type. Al-
most all Western countries are divided between left and right, conservative
and liberal, democrats and republicans. Many Middle-Eastern societies are
split into pro-Western and anti-Western coalitions. Bipolarity of opinions
does not necessarily translate into instability. In most Western countries
(“democracies”), where governance is based on a written constitution and
elections, rules of government are immune to that crude type of instability.
Lawmakers strive to define constitutions that avoid instability generated by
any bipolar split. By contrast some countries in the Middle-East did expe-
rience recently this type of instability. Some Pro-Western coalition formally
constituted the ruling power, nevertheless it could not force any significant
outcome. The anti-Western coalition itself could oppose any outcome but
could force none: Political analysts express this situation by the vocable “
political stalemate” or “impasse”.
Some countries, though immune to bipolar instability, could experience
more sophisticated types of instability. Many parties with distinct political
agendas exist simultaneously. Legal institutions work correctly and choose
some ruling coalition with some program. The ruling coalition includes
two or more parties who agree on most issues. But the exercise of power
becomes impossible when there is a disagreement within the coalition over
the implementation of some important issue. Some party in the opposition
proposes an alliance to some component of the ruling coalition. As a result,
the ruling coalition will eventually be overthrown, and new elections will be
held. This scenario may repeat itself. Lawmakers designed institutions that
are immune against bipolar stalemates but the political and sociological
structure is more complex. Instability may occur. It is important from
the point of view of political science to distinguish between this type of
instability and the bipolar stalemate.
In this paper, using game theoretic tools, we wish to shed some light on
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the structure of instability.
Our approach to instability is similar to that of [5]. In that paper the
scope was limited to coalitional power distributions. In the present paper
we extend our study so as to encompass the major features of strategic
interactions ruled by standard solutions e.g. Nash equilibrium or strong
Nash equilibrium. For that purpose we adopt a model of power that is
similar to that of effectivity structures introduced by Abdou and Keiding
[7]. Here, the general concept is that of interaction form and the solution is
called a settlement.
We consider power systems with abstract outcomes rather than an in-
teraction with specified preferences. This approach allows for the study of
systems as such (institutions), where the profile of actual agents is drawn
from an arbitrary population. Therefore this article can be viewed as a
study in political or social engineering.
In our approach, there is no loss in focusing on the power structure
rather than the strategic form. As it turns out, an interaction form can
be associated to any strategic form and an equilibrium concept, in such a
way that, given any preference profile, an outcome is a settlement of the
interaction form if and only if it is an equilibrium outcome of the strategic
game form. However other interaction forms exist that are not derived from
any strategic game form. An interaction form is said to be stable if any
preference profile gives rise to some settlement.
Now assume that the interaction form is not stable as it is indeed often
the case in political life. As one of the advantages of the model adopted in
this paper, a comparison between different power systems is possible within
the same framework and therefore, at least in some cases, the model sug-
gests why some systems are deemed more stable than others. This question
is most relevant for political institutions, like constitutions or protocols of
government formation.
The general idea in studying unstable systems is to obtain some typol-
ogy of instability. An instability type would determine the general features
along which instability is likely to emerge and consequently the lines along
which the society is likely to split. Technically, this idea leads to a dissection
of the interaction form so as to obtain a graded sequence of substructures.
Some properties that describe stability and instability, like maximally, su-
peradditivity and subadditivity are already known, but they are involved in
the lowest part of the interaction form, the part that one can identify as the
“effectivity function”. Substructures of higher degrees can also be involved
in producing instability. For each degree an exactness property is defined:
it describes whether the joint action (interaction arrays) of some coalition
structure is stronger or not than the independent actions of the coalitions
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that compose that structure. The absence of exactness at some degree im-
plies the opportunity of collusion and for maximal interactive forms it signals
the existence of some cycle.
The same idea applied to local effectivity functions has led to the defi-
nition of an index [5]. Here we extend that definition to interaction forms.
The stability index is a number that may be set to infinity in case of stabil-
ity and that measures the difficulty to block the system, that is to prevent
any settlement from prevailing. If this number is low, for instance two, then
a simple split in the society with strong opposition power on each side can
lead, at polarized preferences, to a stalemate. If the index is high then unless
agents possess some intricate preference profile, a settlement can be reached.
The index plays a role similar to that of the Nakamura Number for simple
games (Nakamura 1979), the difference being that the Nakamura number is
defined on the winning coalition structure only, whereas the stability index
depends on the whole interaction form. In [5], it is shown that, in case of
instability, the index of a maximal local effectivity function is either 2 or
3. Here, even for maximal interaction forms, the index can take any value
between 2 and the cardinal of the alternative set. If the interaction form is
not r-exact for some degree r, then the upper bound on the index is r + 2.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we define the interaction
form as the main object of our model. In section 2 some families of inter-
action forms are presented. Section 3 is devoted to stability and acyclicity.
In section 4 we clarify the notion of cycle and we define the stability index.
Section 5 is the most technical part of the paper; it is devoted to the struc-
ture of instability. In section 6 we apply our theory to strategic game forms
and standard equilibrium notions. In section 7 we provide some examples.
1 Interaction forms
Our basic model in this study is that of interaction form. The latter is a
power model that can be viewed as a generalization of effectivity functions.
An effectivity function is to a game form what a coalitional game is to a
strategic game. Effectivity functions play an important role in implemen-
tation theory [13, 14, 6, 16, 18, 17, 20, 21]. In other directions, effectivity
functions have been used as theoretical tools to analyze solvability problems
of strategic game forms. They proved to be particularly relevant for Nash
solvability of two-player game forms as well as that of rectangular game
forms [9, 10, 11, 2, 3]. However characterizing strong Nash solvability, even
for two-player game forms, necessitates the introduction of other effectivity
structures [2, 7]. Interaction form can thus be viewed as the general ef-
fectivity structure adapted to the solvability problem in the context of any
one-shot (pure) equilibrium concept. But the need for such a structure may
be independently seen during a careful analysis of any complex interaction
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in a political context.
Let N be a set of agents (also called players, individuals) and let A be
a set of states (also called alternatives, issues). Our approach is founded
on the general idea that given some prevailing state, agents dispose of some
power to oppose that state, that is to disrupt it if they have an interest
to do so. We shall illustrate informally our arguments with an example in
politics by taking the case of a government formation in some State. Players
are the atomic entities that are endowed with an autonomous wish and will.
In our example players may be parties, influential groups, lobbies, etc... A
coalition is a subset of players with coordinated action. A government (to
be formed) is any element of A. We start by considering the so-called simple
game model. In a simple game, power is withheld by some setW of winning
coalitions: precisely, a winning coalition has the power to oppose any current
or proposed scenario and to propose any other, whereas a loosing coalition
can oppose no government at all. Whether a winning coalition will object
and act in consequence depends on its actual preferences. If no objection is
formulated, the government is adopted. In technical terms the outcome is
in the core of the simple game given the preferences.
Though simple games can fairly model some decision mechanisms, like
weighted majority voting in some institutions, it is too simple to describe
political issues underlying a government formation in most countries. This
is because in that model a coalition is either absolutely powerful or totally
powerless. An effectivity function E allows a more general distribution of
power among the coalitions. In our example, if B ∈ E(S) whereB is a subset
of possible governments and S is a coalition, then the latter can upset a by
threatening to form some other government in B but does not have enough
power to force precisely one alternative. However here too, the power of a
coalition does not depend on the current state a, in other words the model
takes into account for any coalition, only the part of power that is common
in all states. This is a significant restriction in the model since we think
that in most interactions, a coalition may achieve something if the current
situation is a and something else if it were b. One solution is to allow for
an effectivity power depending on the state a. This is the local effectivity
function (see [2, 4, 7]). The idea to introduce a power description that is
conditional on the state goes back to Rosenthal [19].
Furthermore, it is crucial to note that the same outcome (social state)
may be implemented in various ways. For instance, assume that (S1, S2, S3)
are involved in government formation, and that many scenarios may lead
to a, then in one scenario S2 can upset a by proposing B2, while in the
other coalition S3 can upset the same a by proposing B3. Therefore we
may consider the active coalition structure (S2, S3) as the opposition actor.
Although the action in not coordinated among the coalitions of the active
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coalition structure, there is at least some collusion to oppose a. Taking
into account this idea compels us to introduce the concept of interaction
form. In an interaction form we take into account (1) the dependence of
the interaction power on the actual state in all possible scenarios that lead
to that state and (2) the joint opposition power that the outcome may
activate. In order to block (or dismantle) some outcome, the joint action of
many coalitions may be necessary. Such a joint power potentially activated
at some state is called an interaction array. An interaction form describes all
possible interaction arrays available at some state. Technically, interaction
forms are to game forms and equilibria what effectivity functions are to
game forms and the core. But interaction forms can be studied abstractly
without any reference to game forms. This was first done in [2] and later on
in [4, 7].
Given a preference profile for players, a state can potentially awaken any
interaction array available at that state. Whether there is some incentive to
upset (or dismantle) that state depends on the preference profile. A state is
called a settlement at that profile if no such incentive exists. The interaction
form is said to be stable if it admits at least one settlement at any preference
profile.
An interaction form can be associated to any strategic game form to-
gether with a given equilibrium concept. The model that we adopt in this
paper is similar to that of effectivity structures introduced by Abdou and
Keiding [7]. The advantages of the present model are (1) that it allows for
the representation of various equilibrium concepts within the same interac-
tion form, whereas the other one is specific to one equilibrium concept, (2)
that in the current model, operations like projections faithfully reflect the
change in the underlying active coalition structure. The unifying aspect of
this model lies in the fact that any one-shot solution (e.g., Nash equilibrium,
strong Nash equilibrium, β- core) applied to some game form coincides with
the settlement set of the associated interactive form. One of the advantages
of working in the general framework of power models than that of strategic
models, is that solvability for any standard solution can be expressed by the
same nice though somehow difficult condition namely acyclicity. Any failure
in stability can be seen as the effect of some generalized Condorcet cycle.
An interaction form can thus be viewed as an intrinsic representation of the
power inherent to the system ruled by some equilibrium concept. Once the
interaction form is obtained, only the settlement set matters. This unifica-
tion, a byproduct of our model, is in the same spirit as the one obtained in
Greenberg’s theory of social situations [8] even though our purpose remains
different. On the one hand, a general theory of interactions is not within
the scope of our paper; on the other hand, the model that we adopt applies
to game forms rather than games because our aim is to study properties of
power systems (institutions) and not properties of specific interactions.
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1.1 Notations
Throughout this paper we shall consider a finite set N the elements of which
are called players or agents and a finite set A the elements of which are called
alternatives or states. We make use of the following notational conventions:
For any set D, we denote by P(D) the set of all subsets ofD and by P0(D) =
P(D)\{∅} the set of all non-empty subsets of D. Elements of P0(N) are
called coalitions. If S ∈ P0(N) then N\S is denoted S
c. Similarly if B ∈
P(A), A\B is denoted Bc. L(A) will denote the set of all linear orders
on A (that is all binary relations on A which are complete, transitive, and
antisymmetric). If R ∈ L(A), and a, b ∈ A, a 6= b, a R b means that a is
preferred to b in the linear order R. We also denote by R◦ the strict relation
associated to R. A preference profile (over A) is a map from N to L(A),
so that a preference profile is an element of L(A)N . For every preference
profile RN ∈ L(A)
N and S ∈ P0(N) we put
P (a, S,RN ) = {b ∈ A | b R
◦
i a, ∀i ∈ S}
(so that P (a, S,RN ) consists of all the outcomes considered to be better than
a by all members of the coalition S), and P c(a, S,RN ) = A\P (a, S,RN ).
1.2 The model
In order to model a power distribution, we define an object called interaction
form in the same vein as the effectivity structure of Abdou and Keiding [7].
The elements of A are viewed as (social, political) situations or states. At
any state a ∈ A we dispose of a description of the acting power of the agents
in the society. This acting power which depends generally on a is represented
by a set of interaction arrays. If the state of the society is a, some individuals
or coalitions can move or threat to move to other states upsetting therefore
the state a. Thus power is described as a multipolar force that can be used
to upset a status quo. Formally we define the following:
Definition 1.1 An interaction array on (N,A) is a mapping ϕ : P0(N)→
P(A). An interaction array ϕ is said to be simple if there exists (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈
P(A)n such that for all S ∈ P0(N): ϕ(S) = ∩i∈SB
i. Such an interaction
array is said to be associated to (B1, . . . , Bn).
Let Φ ≡ Φ(N,A) be the set of all interaction arrays. We endow Φ
with the partial order ≤ where ϕ ≤ ϕ′ if and only if ϕ(S) ⊂ ϕ′(S) for all
S ∈ P0(N). By active coalition structure (ACS hereafter) M we mean any
subset of P0(N). By federation F, we mean any subset of ACS. The support
of ϕ denoted [ϕ] is the active coalition structure formed by all coalitions
S ∈ P0(N) such that ϕ(S) 6= ∅. We denote by Φ0 ≡ Φ0(N,A) the subset
of interaction arrays with non empty support. The range of ϕ is the set
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ρ(ϕ) := ∪S∈P0(N)ϕ(S). More generally for any ACS M, the range of ϕ in
M is the set ρM(ϕ) := ∪S∈Mϕ(S).
Definition 1.2 An interaction form over (N,A) is a mapping E from P0(A)
to subsets of Φ0 satisfying the following conditions:
(i) ϕ ≤ ϕ′, ϕ ∈ E [U ]⇒ ϕ′ ∈ E [U ]
(ii)U ⊂ V ⇒ E [V ] ⊂ E [U ]
An interaction form E is said to satisfy the sheaf property if for all U, V ∈
P0(A):
E(U ∪ V ) = E(U) ∩ E(V ).
E is said to be locally effective if for all U ∈ P0(A), ϕ ∈ Φ0:
U ⊂ ρ(ϕ)⇒ ϕ ∈ E [U ]
E is said to be standard if it has the sheaf property and is locally effective.
We may think of an interaction array in E [U ] as a description of an
available move of the agents given any state in U . To interpret the statement
ϕ ∈ E [{a}], one has to assume that a may occur in different scenarios that
are not explicit in the model; any scenario leading to state a may arouse
some coalition S that have the power to drive the outcome into ϕ(S). In an
interaction array all such potential “moves” are described. If, for instance,
ϕ(S) and ϕ(T ) are the only nonempty components of ϕ, then for some
situations with outcome a, coalition S has the power to reach ϕ(S) and for
some situations with the same outcome, coalition T has the power to reach
ϕ(T ). Within each coalition action is coordinated (as in any coalitional
game), but there is no coordination between S and T . Our model is universal
in the sense that a priori any coalition may react to some state in U .
Nevertheless, the fact that ϕ(S) = ∅ for some S means that coalition S
is inhibited or desactivated and therefore that the power represented by ϕ
holds without the participation of S. Therefore the support of ϕ is in fact
the active coalition structure behind ϕ.
Whether coalitions have a real incentive to make their move depends on
the actual preferences. This is why we introduce the following:
Definition 1.3 Let RN ∈ L(A)
N . An alternative a is dominated at RN
if there exists some U ∈ P0(A), U ∋ a, and some ϕ ∈ E(U) such that
ϕ(S) ⊂ P (a, S,RN ) for all S ∈ P0(N). The alternative a is a settlement at
RN if it is not dominated at RN . The set of all settlements at RN will be
denoted: Stl(E , RN ).
It follows from the definition that, even if there is no coordination of actions
between coalitions, some collusion may exist between them (see subsection
5.5). For instance, if for ϕ ∈ E [{a}], ϕ(S) and ϕ(T ) are nonempty and if,
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given the preference profile, both coalitions wish to oppose a, they can do
it: actually it will be S that oppose the outcome in some scenarios and T
in some others. This is why a cannot survive. The absence of a settlement
at some preference profile can be expressed as an impasse or a deadlock.
Stability, therefore, is a highly desirable property for an interaction form.
We end this subsection by a useful definition. For any ϕ : P0(N) →
P(A) we put: ϕ∗(S) = ϕ(S)c, and for an mapping E from P0(A) to subsets
of Φ we define:
E∗[U ] = {ϕ ∈ Φ|ϕ∗ /∈ E [U ]} (1)
An interaction coform over (N,A) is a mapping E from P0(A) to subsets
of Φ such that E∗ is an interaction form. All our theory could have been
formulated using interaction coforms instead of interaction forms. The two
approaches are mathematically equivalent. Interaction forms highlight the
opposition power (that is the β-version of power). They describe the power
to upset some state while coforms describe the conservation power that
forces that state (that is the α-version of power). Those are the two faces of
the same power system, but since we focus on destabilizing power we prefer
the β-version.
2 Some families of interaction forms
In this section we present some generic ways to define interaction forms. Any
game form ruled by a one-shot solution concept gives rise to an interaction
form, the settlement of which reflects faithfully that solution. Similarly an
effectivity function with the core as solution gives rise to some interaction
form to which it can be identified. It follows that the model of interac-
tion forms imbeds the main strategic aspects of game forms as well as the
cooperative aspects of coalitional forms.
2.1 Interaction form and strategic game form
In this subsection, starting from a strategic game form and an equilibrium
concept, we derive a description of the underlying power distribution, thus
defining some interaction form. This derivation of the power embedded in
a strategic form follows the same pattern as the derivation of the α- and
the β-effectivity functions [13] and more recently the derivation of the more
general effectivity structures [2, 7].
Let G = (X1, . . . ,Xn, A, g) be a strategic game form. The set of players
is N = {1, . . . , n}, Xi is the strategy set of players i, g :
∏
i∈N Xi → A is
the outcome function, assumed to be surjective. For each preference profile
RN ∈ L(A)
N , the game form G induces a game (X1, . . . ,Xn;Q1, . . . , Qn)
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with the same strategy spaces as in G and with the Qi is the preorder onXN
defined by: xN Qi yN if and only if g(xN )Ri g(yN ) for xN , yN ∈ XN . We
denote this game by G(RN ).
LetM be an active coalition structure. A strategy array xN ∈ XN is anM-
equilibrium of the game G(RN ) if there is no coalition S ∈M and yS ∈ XS
such that g(yS , xSc) R
◦
i g(xN ) for all i ∈ S.
An alternative a is an M-equilibrium outocme of G at RN if there exists
some equilibrium xN ∈ XN of G(RN ) such that g(xN ) = a. Denote by
EOM(G,RN ) the set of all equilibrium outcomes of (G,RN ).
The game form G is said to be solvable in M-equilibrium or M-solvable,
if for each preference profile RN ∈ L(A)
N , the game G(RN ) has an M-
equilibrium. In particular, whenM = N ≡ {{1}, . . . , {n}}, anM-equilibrium
is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, when M = P0(N), an M-equilibrium is a
strong Nash equilibrium.
The interaction form associated with G and M is the mapping EGβ (M)
defined as follows: For U ∈ P0(A):
EGβ (M)[U ] =
{ϕ ∈ Φ0(N,A) | ∀yN ∈ g
−1(U), ∃S ∈ M, ∃xS ∈ XS : g(xS , ySc) ∈ ϕ(S)} (2)
Lemma 2.1 Let G be a game form. For any active coalition structure M,
the set of M-equilibrium outcomes of G at RN coincides with the settlement
set of EGβ (M) at RN . Therefore G is M-solvable if and only if E
G
β (M) is
stable.
There are other ways to associate interaction forms to some game form,
namely by using other solutions that cannot be formulated directly as an
M-equilibrium. This is the case for the local core and the β-core.
An alternative a is in the local core of G at RN if there is no coalition S ∈
P0(N) with the following property : for any zN ∈ XN such that g(zN ) = a
there exists yS ∈ XS such that g(yS , zSc) R
◦
i g(xN ) for all i ∈ S. Denote by
C1(G,RN ) the local core of G at RN
An alternative a is in the β- core of G at RN if there is no coalition S ∈
P0(N) with the following property: for any zN ∈ XN , there exists yS ∈
XS such that g(yS , zSc) R
◦
i g(xN ) for all i ∈ S. Denote by Cβ(G,RN ) or
C0(G,RN ), the β-core of G at RN .
We may introduce interaction forms EG1 and E
G
0 associated to the local core
and the β- core respectively as follows: For any U ∈ P0(A), we define the
following:
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EG
1
[U ] = {ϕ ∈ Φ|∃S ∈ P0(N), ∀yN ∈ g
−1(U), ∃xS ∈ XS : g(xS , ySc) ∈ ϕ(S} (3)
EG
0
[U ] = EG
1
[A] (4)
Remark that, in general, there is no M ⊂ P0(N) such that E
G
1 = E
G
β (M)
Nevertheless we have:
EG1 [U ] = ∪S∈P0(N)E
G
β ({S})[U ].
(See subsection 5.1 for more details about projections and restrictions).
Lemma 2.2 The local core (resp. β-core) of G at RN coincides with the
settlement set of EG1 (resp. E
G
0 ) at RN . Therefore G is locally stable (resp.
stable) if and only if EG1 (resp. E
G
0 ) is stable .
All the interaction forms defined in this way are standard (definition 1.2).
Corresponding to any solution concept, one can introduce interaction
coforms. For instance corresponding to M-equilibrium one can define the
interaction coform associated with G andM as the mapping EGα (M) where
for all U ∈ P0(A):
EGα (M)[U ] =
{ψ ∈ Φ0(N,A) | ∃yN ∈ g
−1(U), ∀S ∈ M, ∀xS ∈ XS : g(xS , ySc) ∈ ψ(S)} (5)
For any x = xN ∈ XN define the interaction array ψx by ψx(S) =
g(xSc ,XS) (S ∈ P0(N)). In applications it is often easier to compute the
family (ψx, x ∈ XN ). ψx is said to be a basic interaction array at g(x).
Clearly EGα (M) = E
G
β (M)
∗ and EGβ (M) = E
G
α (M)
∗. It is also possible,
starting from the basic interaction arrays, to compute EGα (M) and E
G
β (M):
EGα (M)[U ] = {ϕ ∈ Φ | ∃x ∈ g
−1(U),∀S ∈M : ψx(S) ⊂ ϕ(S)} (6)
EGβ (M)[U ] = {ϕ ∈ Φ | ∀x ∈ g
−1(U),∃S ∈M : ψx(S) ∩ ϕ(S) 6= ∅} (7)
In what follows we illustrate these notions with two examples.
Example 2.3 (Majority game form with status quo) Let N = {1, 2, 3} and
A = {a, b, c}. We consider the majority game form G with status quo.
Formally X1 = X2 = X3 = A and g(x1, x2, x3) = x whenever |{i ∈ N |
xi = x}| ≥ 2 or g(x1, x2, x3) = a and {x1, x2, x3} = A. Let M = P0(N).
We can compute EGα ≡ E
G
α (M) by listing for each z ∈ A all ψx where
x ∈ X1 ×X2 ×X3 is such that such that g(x) = z.
The list for z = b is given by the table 2.3 where rows 2 to 7 correspond
to arrays ψx (x ∈ g
−1(b)) (precisely row 2 represents ψb,b,b, row 3 represents
ψc,b,b, etc ...). The columns list the coalitions (1 for {1}, 12 for {1, 2}, etc
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...). An interaction array ψ is in EGα [b] if and only if it contains some ψx
listed in the table. An interaction array ϕ is in EGβ (M)[b] if and only if for
each line ψx, there corresponds a column S such that ϕ(S) intersects ψx(S).
At the last line of the table we represent one instance of such a ϕ (at each
line x we affected an upper bar, in some entry (x, S), on the alternative that
is in ψx(S) and ϕ(S).
x1 x2 x3 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
b b b b b b abc abc abc¯ abc
c b b b abc abc abc abc abc¯ abc
b c b abc b abc abc abc abc¯ abc
b b c abc abc b abc ab¯c abc abc
a b b b a¯b ab abc abc abc abc
b a b ab b a¯b abc abc abc abc
b b a a¯b ab b abc abc abc abc
ϕ a a a ∅ b c ∅
Figure 1: Table of the basic interaction arrays of EGα [b]
EGα [c] is obtained from E
G
α [b] by a permutation of the roles of b and c. Table
2.3 does the same job for z = a.
x1 x2 x3 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
a a a a a a abc abc abc abc
a a b ab ab a abc abc abc abc
a b a ab a ab abc abc abc abc
b a a a ab ab abc abc abc abc
a a c ac ac a abc abc abc abc
a c a ac a ac abc abc abc abc
c a a a ac ac abc abc abc abc
a b c abc ac ab abc abc abc abc
a c b abc ab ac abc abc abc abc
b a c ac abc ab abc abc abc abc
c a b ab abc ac abc abc abc abc
b c a ac ab abc abc abc abc abc
c b a ab ac abc abc abc abc abc
Figure 2: Table of the basic interaction arrays of EGα [a]
We shall see (subsection 5.1) that from EGβ one can extract E
G
β (M) for
each active coalition structure.
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Example 2.4 (Unanimity game form). Let X be a finite set such that
|X| ≥ 2 and 0 /∈ X and let A = X ∪ {0}. The n-player unanimity game
form on X is defined by setting: Xi = X, i = 1, · · · , n and
g(x1, · · · , xn) = x if x1 = · · · = xn = x
g(x1, · · · , xn) = 0 otherwise.
Let M = P0(N) and a ∈ X. One has:
EGα (M)[a] = {ψ ∈ Φ | ψ(N) = A and ∀S 6= N : {0, a} ⊂ ψ(S)}
EGβ (M)[a] = {ϕ ∈ Φ | ϕ(N) 6= ∅ or ∃S 6= N : {0, a} ∩ ϕ(S) 6= ∅}
The formula for EGα (M)[0] is more complex. Later on (see example 6.10) we
shall compute EGα (M)[0] for some particular ACS M.
2.2 Effectivity functions as interaction forms
Definition 2.5 An effectivity function on (N,A) is a mapping E : P(N)→
P(P0(A)) such that :
(i) E(∅) = ∅,
(ii) B ∈ E(S), B ⊂ B′ ⇒ B′ ∈ E(S)
The core of E at RN denoted C(E,RN ) is the set of outcomes a ∈ A such
that there is no coalition S ∈ P0(N) such that P (a, S,RN ) ∈ E(S). We put:
E = {ϕ ∈ Φ|∃S ∈ P0(N) : ϕ(S) ∈ E(S)} (8)
The “canonical ” interaction form associated to E is defined by: E [U ] = E
for all U ∈ P0(A). For future use we mention the following properties that
play some role in the study of stability. An effectivity function E is said to
be:
monotonic w.r.t. players if for all S, T ∈ P0(N),
S ⊂ T ⇒ E(S) ⊂ E(T ), (9)
regular if for all S1 ∈ P0(N), S2 ∈ P0(N),
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, B1 ∈ E(S1), B2 ∈ E(S2)⇒ B1 ∩B2 6= ∅, (10)
maximal if for all S ∈ P0(N), B ∈ P0(A),
Bc /∈ E(Sc) =⇒ B ∈ E(S), (11)
superadditive if for all S1 ∈ P0(N), S2 ∈ P0(N),
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, B1 ∈ E(S1), B2 ∈ E(S2)⇒ B1 ∩B2 ∈ E(S1 ∪ S2), (12)
subadditive if for all S1 ∈ P0(N), S2 ∈ P0(N),
B1 ∩B2 = ∅, B1 ∈ E(S1), B2 ∈ E(S2)⇒ B1 ∪B2 ∈ E(S1 ∩ S2). (13)
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3 Stability and acyclicity
Let E be an interaction form. Cycles appear naturally in the study of inter-
action forms stability (see [12, 6] for cycles in effectivity functions and [7]
for cycles in more general effectivity structures). For any ϕ ∈ Φ and i ∈ N
we put: ρi(ϕ) = ∪S∋iϕ(S) (the range of player i in ϕ).
Definition 3.1 An E - family is any r-tuple ((U1, ϕ1), . . . , (Ur, ϕr)) where:
Uk ∈ P0(A), ϕk ∈ E [Uk] (k = 1, . . . , r). An E -family is a cycle in E if it
satisfies :
(i) ∪rk=1Uk = A,
(ii) For any i ∈ N and ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} there exists k ∈ J such that for
all l ∈ J : Uk ∩ ρ
i(ϕl) = ∅.
The covering (U1, . . . , Ur) will be called the basis of the cycle. The natural
number r is the order (or the length) of the cycle. Such a cycle will be called
an r- cycle. A cycle is said to be simple if for all k = 1, . . . , r, ϕk is simple
(definition 1.1) The interaction form E is said to be acyclic if it has no cycles.
Remark 3.2 Relation to the literature. In [7] the authors define a model
similar to the present one and called effectivity structure. Let E be an
interactive form. Then one can associate to E an effectivity structure say
E− as follows: for any U ∈ P0(A), the n-tuple (B
1, . . . , Bn) ∈ P(A)n is in
E−[U ] if and only if the simple interaction array associated to (B1, . . . , Bn)
is in E [U ]. The notion of cycle for an effectivity structure is defined in such
a way that to any cycle in E− the associated sequence of simple interaction
arrays is a cycle in E and conversely. Moreover, by proposition 4.3 (section
4) E has a cycle or order r if and only if E− has a cycle of the same order.
The following Theorem, that provides a necessary and sufficient condition
for stability of interaction game forms, can thus be deduced from theorem
6 of [7].
Theorem 3.3 E is stable if and only if E is acyclic.
4 Cycles and stability index
The existence of a cycle is equivalent to instability. As it has been argued
in the introduction, instability that may occur in a political system is not a
chaotic or unanalyzable matter. In a country governed by perennial institu-
tions, unstable situations often present the same features. Governments are
toppled almost in the some way. Institutions are generally paralyzed along
the same opposition lines. That clearly indicates some flaw in the current
institutions or the governance system. In this study this flaw has been iden-
tified as the existence of some cycle. Studying the structure of instability
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amounts to characterizing the nature of cycles. However one must admit
that cycles are complex objects. Therefore we start by a clarification of the
notion of cycle.
4.1 Cycles: the combinatorial formulations
Proposition 4.1 In definition 3.1, one can replace condition (ii) by any of
the two following conditions:
(iib) For any i ∈ N and ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} there exists l ∈ J such that for
all k ∈ J : Uk ∩ ρ
i(ϕl) = ∅,
(iic) For any i ∈ N there exists a permutation k1, · · · , kr of {1 . . . , r} such
that [(Uk1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ukj)] ∩ [ρ
i(ϕkj ) ∪ · · · ∪ ρ
i(ϕkr )] = ∅.
Proof. Assume that (ii) is satisfied. We shall prove (iic). Let i ∈ N .
By taking J = {1, . . . , r} in (ii), we can choose k1 ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that
Uk1 ∩ (∪l∈{1,...,r}ρ
i(ϕl) = ∅. Assume that k1, . . . kj have been chosen such
that: [(Uk1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ukj)] ∩ [∪l∈{1,...,r}\{k1,...,kj−1}ρ
i(ϕl)] = ∅. By taking
J = {1, . . . , r} \ {k1, . . . , kj} we can choose kj+1. Thus (iic) is proved by
induction.
Now we prove (iic) ⇒ (ii) and (iib). Assume that (iic) is satisfied. Let
∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r}. If we take k = ks where s = min{j | kj ∈ J}, then (ii)
is satisfied by that choice of k. If we take l = kt where t = max{j | kj ∈ J},
then (iib) is satisfied by that choice of l. 2
Let r ∈ N, r ≥ 1, let Σr be the set of all selections of P0({1, . . . , r}).
Precisely θ ∈ Σr if θ : P0({1, . . . , r}) → {1, . . . , r} and θ(J) ∈ J for all
J ∈ P0({1, . . . , r}). To any (ϕ1, . . . , ϕr) ∈ Φ
r, θ ≡ (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ (Σr)
n and
k ∈ {1, . . . , r} we associate:
J i,θk := {J ∈ P0({1, . . . , r})|θ
i(J) = k} (14)
Ri,θk (U1, . . . , Ur) := A \
⋃
J∈J i,θ
k
⋃
l∈J Ul (15)
Aθk(ϕ1, . . . , ϕr) :=
⋃n
i=1
⋃
J∈J i,θ
k
⋃
l∈J ρ
i(ϕl) (16)
In what follows Aθk(ϕ1, . . . , ϕr) will be denoted A
θ
k and R
i,θ
k (U1, . . . , Ur) will
be denoted Ri,θk .
Proposition 4.2 An E- family ((U1, ϕ1), . . . , (Ur, ϕr)) is a cycle if and only
if ∪rk=1Uk = A and if there exists θ = (θ
1, . . . , θn) ∈ (Σr)
n such that for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , r} one has : Uk ∩ A
θ
k = ∅.
Proof. Let ((U1, ϕ1), . . . , (Ur, ϕr)) be a cycle with basis (U1, . . . , Ur). For
each i ∈ N we define θi ∈ Σr as follows: By property (ii) of definition 3.1,
we put θi(J) = k if for all l ∈ J , we have Uk ∩ ρ
i(ϕl = ∅. It follows that
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Uk ∩ A
θ
k = ∅ (k = 1 . . . , r). Conversely if these relations hold then property
(ii) of definition 3.1 is clearly satisfied. 2
In the following we clarify the relation between cycles and simple cycles
(definition 3.1).
Proposition 4.3 Let ((U1, ϕ1), . . . , (Ur, ϕr)) be an E-family such that (U1,
. . . , Ur) be a covering of A. The following are equivalent:
(i) ((U1, ϕ1), . . . , (Ur, ϕr)) is a cycle,
(ii) There exists θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ (Σr)
n such that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , r} the
simple interaction array ψk associated to (R
1,θ
k , . . . ,R
n,θ
k ) satisfies ϕk ≤ ψk
(k = 1 . . . , r),
(iii) There exist simple interaction arrays ψ1, . . . , ψr such that ϕk ≤ ψk
(k = 1 . . . , r) and
(
(U1, ψ1), . . . , (Ur, ψr)
)
is a cycle.
Proof. (iii) ⇒ (i) is straightforward. We first prove (i)⇒ (ii). Let ((U1, ϕ1),
. . . , (Ur, ϕr)) be a cycle and let i ∈ N . In view of (iib) of proposition 4.1, one
can find θi ∈ Σr such that for all J ∈ P0({1, . . . , r}), ρ
i(ϕθi(J))∩ (∪l∈JUl) =
∅. It follows that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , r} one has ρi(ϕk)∩ (∪J∈J i
k
∪l∈J Ul) = ∅
or equivalently ρi(ϕk) ⊂ R
i,θ
k . Define a simple interaction array ψk by
ψk(S) = ∩i∈SR
i,θ
k (S ∈ P0(N)). Clearly for all S ∈ P0(N) one has ϕk(S) ⊂
ψk(S) or equivalently ϕk ≤ ψk.
Now we prove (ii) ⇒ (iii). If the ψk are as in (ii), ψk ∈ E [Uk] and ρ
i(ψk) =
Ri,θk so that property (iib) of proposition 4.1 is satisfied for
(
(U1, ψk), . . . ,
(Ur, ψr)
)
entailing that the latter is indeed a cycle. 2
The following shows that existence of a cycle of some order is concomitant
to the existence of a simple cycle of the same order. This result, combined
with remark 3.2 proves in particular, that an interaction form is acyclic if
and only if its associated effectivity structure is acyclic.
Corollary 4.4 A covering (U1, . . . , Ur) of A is the basis of some cycle of
E if and only if there exists θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ (Σr)
n such that for all k ∈
{1, . . . , r} the simple interaction array ψk associated to (R
1,θ
k , . . . ,R
n,θ
k ) is
in E(Uk).
Finally one can formulate the problem of the existence of a cycle as
a fixed point theorem. Let Cr be the set of coverings (U1, . . . , Ur) of A.
Let Ψ(r) ≡ (Ψ
(r)
1 , . . . ,Ψ
(r)
r ) : (Σr)
n × Cr → Φ
r be the map where for all k
Ψ
(r)
k (θ
1, . . . , θn;U1, . . . , Ur) denotes the simple interaction array associated
to (R1,θk , . . . ,R
n,θ
k ). Then there exists some cycle of E of order r if and only
if there exists θ ∈ (Σr)
n and (U1, . . . , Ur) ∈ Cr such that:
Ψ
(r)
k (θ
1, . . . , θn;U1, . . . , Ur) ∈ E [Uk] (k = 1, . . . , r) (17)
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The ingredients that compose a cycle are thus: a covering (or a partition)
(U1, . . . , Ur) and a combinatorial setting θ = (θ
1, . . . , θn) ∈ (Σr)
n. A typol-
ogy of cycles is an equivalence relation on the set of cycles: two cycles are
in the same class if and only if they are “homologous” in some sense. In
this paper we limit the study to the simplest equivalence relation, namely
the one where two cycles are considered as equivalent if and only if they
are of the same order. This number called the index, measures, in a given
interaction form, the complexity attached to the emergence of a cycle. This
is only a first step in the understanding of instability. We implicitly assume
that cycles of higher orger are more difficult to emerge. The stability index
is an indicator for the likelihood of the potential occurrence of instability.
Definition 4.5 The stability index of E , denoted σ(E), is the minimal order
of a cycle in E . This number is set to +∞ if E is acyclic.
4.2 Index and merging alternatives
Let f : A→ A′ be a map. If ϕ′ ∈ Φ(N,A′) we denote f−1 ◦ ϕ′, the element
ϕ of Φ(N,A) defined by ϕ(S) = (f−1 ◦ ϕ′)(S) for all S ∈ P0(N). For any
interaction form E on (N,A) we define the interaction form Ef on (N,A′)
as follows: For U ′ ∈ P0(A
′) :
Ef [U ′] = {ϕ′ ∈ Φ(N,A′)| f−1 ◦ ϕ′ ∈ E [f−1(U ′)]}
The Ef - family ((U ′1, ϕ
′
1), . . . , (U
′
r, ϕ
′
r)), is a cycle of E
f if and only if the
E- family ((f−1(U ′1), f
−1 ◦ϕ′1), . . . , (f
−1(U ′r), f
−1 ◦ϕ′r)) is a cycle. It follows
that if E is acyclic then Ef is acyclic.
Let ((U1, ϕ1), . . . , (Ur, ϕr)) be a cycle of E based on the partition (U1, . . . ,
Ur). Let A
′ be some set with r elements A′ := {u1, . . . , ur} and let f :
A → A′ be defined by f(a) = uk for a ∈ Uk. Define ϕ
′ ∈ Φ(N,A′) by
putting ϕ′k(S) := f(ϕk(S)) (S ∈ P0(N)) . For any S ∈ P0(N) and k, l ∈
{1, . . . , r} one has Uk ∩ ϕl(S) = ∅ if and only if {uk} ∩ f(ϕl(S)) = ∅. It
follows that ({(u1}, ϕ
′
1), . . . , ({ur}, ϕ
′
r)) is a cycle of E
f based on the partition
({u1}, . . . , {ur}). Therefore we have the following characterization of the
index, that generalizes a similar result obtained for local effectivity functions
([5], Theorem 4.3).
Theorem 4.6 The index of an unstable interaction form E is the smallest
integer s for which there exists a surjective mapping f : A→ {1, . . . , s} such
that Ef is unstable.
This characterization provides an interpretation of the stability index.
Assume that an interaction form is unstable with a stability index σ, then
merging some social states (or alternatives) results in a decrease of the num-
ber of alternatives and a transformation of the interaction form in a way that
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respects power distribution. This is the interpretation of the transformation
E → Ef . This transformation may occur, for instance, when the agents do
not distinguish any more between two previously different alternatives. If
the number of the new alternatives is less than σ then the new interaction
form will be stable. When σ = 2 (see special subsection 5.6 on bipolarity)
alternatives can be partitioned into two aggregates, or two major issues, over
which the society can be opposed, and the power of agents or institutions
allowed by the rules is such that either issue can be opposed and neither
can be forced. Efficient institutions are designed in order to avoid this sit-
uation. Most modern political systems, though immune to bipolarity, may
suffer higher order cycles. On the one hand, the formation of a cycle of lower
order is less costly than that of a cycle of higher order. This is due to the
cooperation factor (coalitions must coordinate their strategies) and the col-
lusion factor (many coalitions may be needed to contribute in order to upset
the same outcome, because multiple scenarios with the same outcome are
potentially available). On the other hand the more sophisticated is a society,
the more unlikely is the formation of a cycle of lower order: this is because
the number of relevant (politically significant) alternatives is high. Compare
two societies that have been given the same institutions, with index 3 for
instance. The first society is split by an ethnic or religious strife, while the
second society lives with many social issues considered as relevant. In the
first society, ethnic or religious conflict cannot create an impasse; while it is
possible, in the second case, to observe instability, though the occurrence of
the latter is tempered by the fact that conditions of cyclicity are somehow
difficult to crystallize.
5 The structure of instability
In this section we shall try to determine or at least provide an estimation for
the stability index. For that purpose we are going to devise some structural
properties on interaction forms. Precisely we shall extract some appropri-
ate substructures from the basic structure. The simplest substructure is
the one that contains the local and the global effectivity functions E1 and
E0, respectively. This will be the object of subsection 5.3. Higher order
substructures may also be extracted (subsection 5.4) and the notion of ex-
actness is defined (subsection 5.5) for each. The tools that we provide are
not merely technical. Each of the notions and operations that we shall de-
fine (projection, federation, exactness) have a theoretical role and possess
an intuitive interpretation. We start by the projection operation.
5.1 Projection
As explained above, an interaction array is defined on P0(N), so that the
model allows a priori the surge of any coalition. Now it may be the case that
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institutionally (by law or structural impossibilities) some coalitions are not
allowed to form: only coalitions in someM⊂ P0(N) can actually be active.
For instance in a legislature (Senate, House of representatives) only some
coalitions are practically possible. The definitions can be adapted in order
to take into account these institutional limitations. An alternative a is M-
dominated at the preference profile RN if there exists some U ∈ P0(A), U ∋ a
and ϕ ∈ E(U) such that [ϕ] ⊂ M and ϕ(S) ⊂ P (a, S,RN ) for all S ∈ M.
The alternative a is an M -settlement at RN if it is not M-dominated at
RN . The set of allM-settlements at RN will be denoted: Stl(M)(E , RN ). In
order to cope with this situation without changing our model, we would like
to define an interaction form that reflects the activity of the active coalition
structureM. This is precisely the role of the following operation. For ϕ ∈ Φ
the projection of ϕ on M, denoted ϕM is defined by:
ϕM(S) :=
{
ϕ(S) if S ∈M
∅ if S /∈M
The projection of E on M is the interaction form E(M) defined by :
E(M)[U ] := {ϕ ∈ Φ | ϕM ∈ E [U ]} (18)
In particular E(∅)[U ] = ∅ and if M1 and M2 are subsets of P0(N) then
E(M1)(M2) = E(M1 ∩M2)[U ] = E(M1)[U ] ∩ E(M2)[U ].
Clearly one has: Stl(M)(E , RN ) = Stl(E(M), RN ).
As a general remark one can see that allowing that some ϕ(S) be empty is
not only an innocuous convention: it has to be interpreted as meaning: the
intervention of S is not needed in the interaction array ϕ.
5.2 Federation
Now consider the case of a legislative body composed of two Chambers.
If a, a confidence motion for instance, is disrupted by an active coalition
structure, say M, in Chamber 1, then a is discarded. If a passes Chamber
1 unopposed then it has to be presented to Chamber 2, where the active
structure is T . We assume that M and T exert their sovereignty indepen-
dently. Then in order to analyze the whole governance structure we need to
introduce the federation {M,T }.
We shall call federation any set F of active coalition structures. Federations
will be denoted by symbols F,M,P . . .
Examples of federations are the Congress in the USA (Senate and House
of representatives, where some proposal is submitted successively to both
legislatures), the Parliament in France ( Assemble´e Nationale and Se´nat).
More generally any institution with two or more levels of independent leg-
islatures. In a federation any component is an active coalition structure. It
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is assumed that each component acts independently of other components.
One can note a difference between the activity of an ACS and that of a
federation. For an ACS, in order to rule out some state a, a joint action of
the components-coalitions may be needed: in general no coalition of its own
is assumed to have the power to rule out that state. On the federation level,
if the state is ruled out by some active structure (e.g., Chamber 1), then it
is discarded.
The notions of F-settlement and F-stability are defined in consequence: An
alternative a is F-dominated at the preference profile RN if there exists some
M∈ F, U ∈ P0(A), U ∋ a and ϕ ∈ E(M)[U ] and ϕ(S) ⊂ P (a, S,RN ) for all
S ∈M. The alternative a is an F -settlement at RN if it is not F-dominated
at RN . The set of F-settlements at RN will be denoted: StlF(E , RN ). The
second operation that we need is the following:
The restriction of E to the federation F is defined by:
EF[U ] :=
⋃
M∈F
E(M)[U ] (19)
It is clear from the definition that: if F1 and F2 are two federations, then
EF1∪F2 [U ] = EF1 [U ] ∪ EF2 [U ].
Moreover one has: StlF(E , RN ) = Stl(EF, RN ) = ∩M∈FStl(E(M), RN ).
Example 5.1 a) Let S = P0(N). S is the active coalition structure cor-
responding to the situation where all coalitions have some joint power. A
settlement for S is similar to a strong Nash equilibrium outcome ( see sub-
section 2.1).
b) Let M = N := {{i}| i ∈ N}. N is the active coalition structure corre-
sponding to the situation where only individuals have some joint power. A
settlement for N is similar to a Nash equilibrium outcome (subsection 2.1).
In the case of interaction forms associated to strategic game forms EGα (N )
is the projection of EGα (P0(N)) on N .
c) Let F ≡ M1 = {{S} | S ∈ P0(N)}. M1 is the federation where every
active coalition structure is a single coalition. This is a context where every
coalition have an independent (as opposed to joint) power. A settlement in
this case is similar to an element of the local core (subsection 2.1). In the
case of interaction forms associated to strategic game forms, with solution
the local core, the corresponding interaction form EG1 is the restriction of
EGα (P0(N)) on M1.
Remark 5.2 1) Let M = {{S} : S ∈M}. There is an important difference
between E(M) and EM. E(M) reflects the uncoordinated power of one ac-
tive coalition structure acting jointly and simultaneously, whereas M reflects
the aggregate power of coalitions acting independently of each other.
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2) What is the result of adding a coalition S to some active coalition
structure M ? We obtain the active coalition structure M′ = M ∪ {S}.
What is the result if we federate {S} to M ? We obtain the federation
F = {M, {S}}. In general, since M ⊂ M′ and {S} ⊂ M′ we have
EF[U ] = E(M)[U ] ∪ E({S})[U ] ⊂ E(M
′)[U ]. Now what happens if S = N ?
If we assume that any ϕ with ϕ(N) 6= ∅ is in E [U ] (N is sovereign), then we
have E(M′) = EF.
One of the advantages of our present model of interaction forms com-
pared to the one proposed in Abdou and Keiding [7] is that it allows for
projections and restrictions in a way that will prove relevant in the case of
interaction forms derived from strategic game forms. In subsection 2.1, we
associated to any game form G and ACS M an interaction form denoted
EGβ (M). Then it is clear from the definition that E
G
β (M) is the projec-
tion of EGβ (P0(N)) on M or using the notations of the present subsection
EGβ (M) = (E
G
β (P0(N))(M). By restriction of E
G
β to the federation M1 we
have the local effectivity function of G namely EG1 etc... In some sense
EGβ (P0(N)) is “universal”. The model of effectivity structure of [7] does
not allow for projections and restrictions. The following subsections make
precise this idea and extend it to any interactive form.
5.3 Induced effectivity: E0, E1, E1, E0
In subsection 2.2 we have shown how interaction forms generalize effectivity
functions; now we show how they induce effectivity functions.
If S ∈ P(N) and B ∈ P0(A), denote by δS,B the element of Φ such that:
δS,B(T ) =
{
∅ if T 6= S
B if T = S
Let E ba an interaction form and let M1 := {{S} | S ∈ P0(N)} be the
federation composed of all ACS that are singletons.
Let E1 be the restriction of E to M1, let E0 := E1[A] and let E0 be the
interaction form defined by E0[U ] := E0 for all U ∈ P0(A).
For S ∈ P0(N) and U ∈ P0(A) , we define E1 and E0 as follows:
E1[U ](S) = {B ∈ P0(A) | δS,B ∈ E [U ]} (20)
E0(S) = {B ∈ P0(A) | δS,B ∈ E [A]}
= E1[A](S) (21)
E1 is the local effectivity function induced by E , E0 is the (global) effectivity
function induced by E . Moreover for any U ∈ P0(A), one has:
E1[U ] = {ϕ ∈ Φ|∃S ∈ P0(N) : ϕ(S) ∈ E1[U ](S)} (22)
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E0 = {ϕ ∈ Φ|∃S ∈ P0(N) : ϕ(S) ∈ E0(S)} (23)
Let C(E0, RN ) be the core of E0 atRN ( subsection 2.2). One has Stl(E0, RN ) =
C(E0, RN ).
Definition 5.3 An interaction form E is said to be maximal (resp. regular,
superadditive, subadditive), if E0 satisfies that property (subsection 2.2).
¿From now on, we shall use E0 or E0 indifferently when we want to refer
to the effectivity function extracted from E . We shall also use C(E0, ·) or
Stl(E0, ·) to refer to the core correspondence of E0.
5.4 Higher order derived structures : Er, r ≥ 2
E0 (or equivalently E0) will play a fundamental role in the sequel. However
E0 represents the lowest level in the interaction: the level of independent and
global power of single coalitions. In order to study the structure of insta-
bility especially the stability index, one may need higher level “effectivity”.
Therefore we are led to the definition of a graded family of derived struc-
tures. Let A1 be the federation M1 ≡ {{S} | S ∈ P0(N)}. For r ≥ 2, let Ar
be the set of active coalition structures M such that |M| = r, N /∈ M and
for all S, T ∈M such that S 6= T we have S ∪ T = N .
When r ≥ 2, M ∈ Ar if and only if M
∗ := {T | T c ∈ M} is composed of
r nonempty disjoint subsets of N . We put Mr = ∪
k=r
k=1Ak. An element of
M ≡ Mn will be called an admissible ACS.
Let E be an interaction form. Let Er ≡ EMr be the restriction of E to Mr.
On has:
Stl(E0, RN ) ⊃ Stl(E1, RN ) ⊃ · · · ⊃ Stl(En, RN ) ⊃ Stl(E , RN ) (24)
5.5 Exactness and opportunity of collusion
In order to obtain some indications on the existence of cycles in some derived
substructure Er, we define the notion of exactnes as a generalization of the
notion bearing the same name introduced in Abdou [2]. In what follows, if
ϕ ∈ Φ, M an ACS, we denote by ρM(ϕ) := ∪S∈Mϕ(S). We recall that E0
is the (global) effectivity function derived from E (see equation 21). For any
active coalition structure M, we define the following sets:
Φ∗(M) = {ϕ ∈ Φ | ρM(ϕ) 6= A} (25)
E0(M) = {ϕ ∈ Φ∗(M) | ∃S ∈M, ϕ(S) ∈ E0(S)} (26)
E∗(M) = {ϕ ∈ Φ∗(M) | ∀a /∈ ρM(ϕ), ϕ ∈ E(M)[A \ ρM(ϕ)]} (27)
Eξ(M) = {ϕ ∈ Φ∗(M) | ∃a /∈ ρM(ϕ), ϕ ∈ E(M)[a]} (28)
D(M) = {ϕ ∈ Φ | S, T ∈M, S 6= T ⇒ ϕ(S) ∩ ϕ(T ) = ∅} (29)
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Remark that we have the equalities:
E0(M) = ∪a∈A{ϕ | a /∈ ρM(ϕ), ϕ ∈ E0(M)[A]}
E∗(M) = ∪a∈A{ϕ | a /∈ ρM(ϕ), ϕ ∈ E(M)[A \ ρM(ϕ)]}
Eξ(M) = ∪a∈A{ϕ | a /∈ ρM(ϕ), ϕ ∈ E(M)[a]}
so that: E0(M) ⊂ E∗(M) ⊂ Eξ(M).
In order to have an intuitive interpretation of these sets, assume for a while
that E is standard (definition 1.2). Eξ(M) represents the power to reach
interaction arrays in Φ∗(M) that an ACS holds when it acts according to
E . E∗(M) which, for a standard E , is equal to E(M)[A]∩Φ∗(M) represents
the global power held byM. E0(M) represents the sum of the global power
that coalitions in M hold independently and separately.
Definition 5.4 Let M be an ACS. E is M-exact if one has:
Eξ(M) ∩D(M) = E0(M) ∩D(M) (30)
Let r ∈ N, 1 ≤ r ≤ n. E is r-exact if it is M-exact for all M ∈ Mr. In
particular E is said to be exact if it is 1-exact and fully exact if it is n-exact.
What is the additional power that an ACS M derives from the interaction
compared to the sum of the global power that coalitions hold separately
? If ϕ ∈ Eξ(M) and ϕ /∈ E0(M). Then for some a /∈ ρM(ϕ), we have
ϕ ∈ E(M)[a] and ϕ /∈ E0(M)[A]. The interactive power of the coalitions
of M is stronger than their independent power: we say that there is an
opportunity of collusion at a. Indeed, if a is proposed and coalitions of M
prefer to reject a, then it may be the case that ϕ cannot be in their power
because no coalition can do it independently since ∀S ∈ M, ϕ(S) /∈ E0(S),
whereas they can very well do it jointly since ϕ ∈ E(M[a]: that is, in
any scenario where a is proposed some coalition S ∈ M can counter it by
ϕ(S). Collusion is not cooperation. Collusion (in politics, diplomacy or war)
expresses precisely a situation where two or more distinct forces, though not
formally cooperating, have an objective interest to target the same state (in
our interpretation their common goal is to upset that state). M-exactness
amounts to say that restricted to D(M) there is no such additional power.
Therefore when restricted to D(M), the joint power of the ACS M can be
decoupled, that is to say, distributed between the coalitions that compose
the ACS. In the following example 1-exactness fails though the interaction
form does not present any local dependence.
Example 5.5 Let |A| = p ≥ 3. For any U ∈ P0(A), put: E [U ] =
{ϕ ∈ Φ | ϕ(N) 6= ∅ or ∃S, T 6= N,S ∪ T = N, |ϕ(S) ∪ ϕ(T )| ≥ p− 1}
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It is clear that E does not depend on U . Moreover for any S ∈ P0(N) a ∈ A,
S 6= N : E1[a](S) = E0(S) = {B | |B| ≥ p−1}, E0(N) = E1[a](N) = P0(A),
and for any S, T 6= ∅, N with S ∪ T = N :
E0({S, T})
= {ϕ | |ϕ(S) ∪ ϕ(T )| ≤ p− 1} ∩ {ϕ | |ϕ(S)| ≥ p− 1 or |ϕ(T )| ≥ p− 1}
= {ϕ | |ϕ(S)| = p− 1 and ϕ(T ) = ∅} ∪ {ϕ | |ϕ(T )| = p− 1 and ϕ(S) = ∅}
Eξ({S, S
c}) = {ϕ | |ϕ(S) ∪ ϕ(Sc)| = p− 1}
Since there is no dependence on U , E is 1-exact. However E is not 2-exact:
indeed E0({S, S
c}) ∩D({S, Sc})6= Eξ({S, S
c}) ∩D({S, Sc}). There is some
additional power in Eξ({S, S
c}) that exceeds the union of the separate effec-
tivity power of S and Sc as represented by E0(S) and E0(S
c) respectively.
Example 5.6 Let |A| = p ≥ 2. For any a ∈ A, U ∈ P0(A), let wa :
P0(N) → {1, . . . , p}, E [a] = {ϕ | ∃S ∈ P0(N) : |ϕ(S)| ≥ wa(S)} and
E(U) = ∩a∈UE [a].
Let w(S) = maxa∈A wa(S), then one obtains:
E1[a](S) = {B | |B| ≥ wa(S)} , E0(S) = {B | |B| ≥ w(S)},
Eξ({S} = {ϕ | ϕ(S) 6= A and |ϕ(S)| ≥ mina/∈ϕ(S) wa(S)}
Then it is easy to see that E is 1-exact if and only if ∀a ∈ A, ∀S ∈ P0(N) :
wa(S) = w(S) (E is independent of U). Assume that this condition is
satisfied. For any ACSM and ϕ ∈ Φ, with ρM(ϕ) 6= A, one has ϕ ∈ Eξ(M)
if and only if ∃S ∈ M : |ϕ(S)| ≥ w(S). It follows that : Eξ(M) = E0M).
Since this equality is true is for any ACS M then, in particular, E is fully
exact.
We shall prove that full exactness is a necessary condition of stability of
maximal interaction forms. More importantly, the absence of r-exactness is
a symptom of the presence of some cycle of order ≤ r + 2. We start by the
following :
Lemma 5.7 Let r ∈ N, 1 ≤ r ≤ n. If E is r-exact and E0(N) = P0(A),
then for all RN ∈ L(A)
N : C(E0, RN ) = Stl(E1, RN ) = · · · = Stl(Er, RN ).
Proof. For any interaction form E and any profile RN we have Stl(Er, RN ) ⊂
C(E0, RN ). Assume that E is r-exact and E0(N) = P0(A). Let a ∈ A
be dominated in Er at RN . Put ϕ(S) = P (a, S,RN ) (S ∈ P0(N)). Then
a /∈ ρM(ϕ) and ϕ ∈ E(M)({a}) for someM ∈ Mr so that ϕ ∈ Eξ(M). If for
some S, T ∈M, S 6= T , ϕ(S)∩ϕ(T ) 6= ∅, then ϕ(N) = ϕ(S)∩ϕ(T ) ∈ E0(N)
and it follows that a is dominated in E0. If for all S, T ∈ M, S 6= T ,
ϕ(S) ∩ ϕ(T ) = ∅, then, by r-exactness ϕ ∈ E0(M) ∩D(M). It follows that
there exists S ∈ M such that ϕ(S) ∈ E0(S) so that a is dominated in E0.
2
24
If a maximal interaction form fails to be r-exact for some r ≥ 1, then it is
unstable. More precisely we have the following technical result:
Lemma 5.8 Let r ∈ N, 1 ≤ r ≤ n. Assume that E is maximal. If E is not
r-exact then:
(i) Er has a cycle of order ≤ r + 2,
(ii) If further E is superadditive, then there exists some RN ∈ L(A)
N such
that Stl(Er, RN ) = ∅ and |C(E0, RN )| = 1.
Proof. If E is not r- exact, then there exists, an active coalition structure
M ∈ Mr, a ∈ A, ϕ ∈ D(M) such that ϕ ∈ E(M)[a], a /∈ ρM(ϕ), and
for all S ∈ M, ϕ(S) /∈ E0(S). Let M = {S1, . . . , Sr}. Let Tk = S
c
k
(k = 1, . . . , r), Bk = ϕ(Sk), T0 = N \ ∪
r
1Tk, and B0 = A \ ∪
r
1Bk. Since
E0 is maximal we have that B
c
k ∈ E0(Tk) (k = 1 . . . , r). Consider the
r + 2-tuple ((U0, ϕ0), . . . , (Ur+1, ϕr+1)) defined as follows: U0 := B0 \ {a},
ϕ0 := δN,{a}, Uk := Bk, ϕk = δTk ,Bck (k = 1, . . . , r), Ur+1 := {a}, ϕr+1 := ϕ.
If B0 \ {a} 6= ∅, this defines a cycle of order r + 2. If B0 \ {a} = ∅ we can
remove index 0 and thus have a cycle of order r + 1.
(ii) We construct a profile RN = (Ri)i∈N with the following properties:
(i ∈ Tk, k 6= 0) : A \B0 ∪Bk Ri {a} Ri B0 \ {a} Ri Bk
(i ∈ T0) : {a} Ri A \B0 Ri B0 \ {a}
An alternative b ∈ Bk where k ∈ {1, . . . , r} is dominated in E0 since B
c
k ∈
E0(Tk) and B
c
k ⊂ P (b, Tk, RN ). An alternative b ∈ B0 \ {a} is dominated in
E0 since by maximality of E0, {a} ∈ E0(N) and {a} ⊂ P (b,N,RN ). It fol-
lows that C(E0, RN ) ⊂ {a}. For k = 1, . . . , r, Sk = ∪l 6=kTl, P (a, Sk, RN ) =
∩l 6=kP (a, Tl, RN ) = ∩l 6=kA\(B0∪Bl) = Bk = ϕ(Sk). So that a is not a settle-
ment in Er. Since Stl(Er, RN ) ⊂ C(E0, RN ), it follows that Stl(Er, RN ) = ∅.
If furthermore E0 is superadditive, one can prove that C(E0, RN ) = {a}. 2
We thus have an easy characterization of r- exactness when E0 is maximal
and superadditive:
Proposition 5.9 Let r ∈ N, 1 ≤ r ≤ n. Let E be maximal and superad-
ditive. Then E is r-exact if and only if Stl(Er, RN ) = C(E0, RN ) for all
RN ∈ L(A)
N .
Proof. Since E0 is maximal, then in particular E0(N) = P0(A). If E is r-
exact, in view of lemma 5.7, Stl(Er, RN ) = C(E0, RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N .
The converse follows from lemma 5.8. 2
The following provides necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of Er
with maximal E0:
Theorem 5.10 Let r ∈ N, 1 ≤ r ≤ n. Assume that E0 is maximal. Er
is stable if and only if E0 is stable and E is r-exact. Moreover in this case
Stl(Er, RN ) = C(E0, RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N .
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Proof. Assume that E0 is maximal. If Er is stable then in view of lemma
5.8 (ii) E is r-exact. Moreover since C(E0, RN ) ⊃ Stl(Er, RN ) for all RN ∈
L(A)N , E0 is stable. Conversely if E0 is stable then, in particular E0 is
superadditive and if in addition E is r-exact then Stl(Er, RN ) = C(E0, RN )
(Proposition 5.9). 2
Now we deduce necessary conditions for stability of any interaction form E
with maximal E0.
Theorem 5.11 Assume that E0 is maximal. If E is stable then:
(i) E0 is stable: that is E0 is superadditive and subadditive,
(ii) E is fully exact, in particular for all 1 ≤ r ≤ n, for all RN ∈ L(A)
N ,
one has :
Stl(Er, RN ) = C(E0, RN )
As a second consequence of lemma 5.8, we obtain the following partial lo-
calization of the index in case of unstable E :
Theorem 5.12 Assume E is maximal :
(i) If E is not regular then σ(E) = 2,
(ii) If E is not subadditive or not superadditive then σ(E) = 3
(iii) If E is not r-exact then σ(E) ≤ r + 2.
Proof (i) follows from [5] Theorem 4.9. (ii) is a consequence of Lemma 5.8
(i).
5.6 Bipolarity: When the Index is 2
Intuitively a conflictual situation is bipolar when there are two main forces
that oppose any settlement. In this short subsection we show the following:
whatever is the equilibrium concept that underlies the power system, index
2 is the symptom of the existence of two disjoint coalitions, that can veto
any settlement. It is not obvious from the definition of a cycle that a cycle
of order 2 marks the existence of two disjoint coalitions with incompatible
effectivity power. This will be done under the condition of monotonicity
that we now define.
For any µ : P0(N) → P0(N) and ϕ ∈ Φ we associate ϕ
µ ∈ Φ defined by
ϕµ(S) = ∪{ϕ(T ) : µ(T ) = S}. µ is said to be an inclusion map if for all
T ∈ P0(N) : T ⊂ µ(T ).
Definition 5.13 E is said to be monotonic if for any inclusion map µ and
any U ∈ P0(A): if ϕ ∈ E [U ] then ϕ
µ ∈ E [U ].
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Lemma 5.14 Let E an effectivity function and let E be the interaction form
canonically associated to E (subsection 2.2). Then E is monotonic in the
sense of the definition 5.13 if and only if E is monotonic w.r.t. players in
the sense of the definition of subsection 2.2.
Proof. Indeed assume that E is monotonic. Let S ⊂ T and let µ be such
that µ(S′) = S′ if S′ 6= S and µ(S) = T . Then µ is an inclusion map.
If B ∈ E(S) then ϕ ≡ δS,B ∈ E . It follows that ϕ
µ = δT,B ∈ E so that
B ∈ E(T ). Conversely, assume that E is monotonic w.r.t. players and let µ
be any inclusion map. If ϕ ∈ E , then for some S ∈ P0(N), ϕ(S) ∈ E(S) or
equivalently ϕ′ ≡ δS,ϕ(S) ∈ E . Let T = µ(S). Then S ⊂ T and ϕ
′µ(S′) = ∅
for all S′ 6= T . It follows that ϕ′µ = δT,ϕ(S) and ϕ(S) ∈ E(T ). We conclude
that ϕ′µ ∈ E . Now since ϕ′µ ≤ ϕµ it follows that ϕµ ∈ E. 2
Let E is monotonic, let µ be an inclusion map, M,M′ any ACS such that
µ(M) ⊂M′. If ϕ ∈ E(M)[U ] then ϕµ ∈ E(M′)[U ] .
For any strategic game form G, EGβ is monotonic.
Theorem 5.15 Let E be monotonic.
(i) The index of E is 2 if and only if the index of its derived local effectivity
function E1 is 2.
(ii) If in addition E is standard (definition 1.2), then the index of E is 2 if
and only if the index of its derived (global) effectivity function E0 is 2, that
is if and only if E is not regular.
Proof. Let (U1, ϕ1), (U2, ϕ2) be a cycle where wlog, we assume that (U1, U2)
is a partition of A. LetM = [ϕ1]∪[ϕ2]. Let T0 = {i ∈ N | R
i(ϕ1)∪R
i(ϕ2) =
∅}. Let Ts(s = 1, 2) be the set of i ∈ N\T0 such that Us∩(R
i(ϕ1)∪R
i(ϕ2)) =
∅. By property (ii) of definition 3.1, (T0, T1, T2) is a partition of N . For any
i ∈ N , let Hi := {S | S ∋ i}. We have i ∈ T0 if and only if H
i ∩M = ∅. If
i ∈ T1 and S ∈ H
i then ϕ1(S)∪ϕ2(S) ⊂ U2. Similarly if j ∈ T2 and S ∈ H
j
then ϕ1(S)) ∪ ϕ2(S) ⊂ U1. If follows that H
i ∩ Hj contains only coalitions
S such that ϕ1(S)) ∪ ϕ2(S) = ∅ or put equivalently H
i ∩ Hj ∩ M = ∅
or put otherwise: for any S ∈ M either S ⊂ T1 or S ⊂ T2. Moreover
by property (ii) of definition 3.1, if S ⊂ T1 then ϕ2(S) ∩ (U1 ∪ U2) = ∅.
Since U1 ∪ U2 = A, it follows that ϕ2(S) = ∅. Similarly if S ⊂ T2 then
ϕ1(S) = ∅. Let µ : P0(N) → P0(N) defined by µ(S) = Tk if S ⊂ Tk
(k = 1, 2) and µ(S) = N if S /∈ M. Since E is monotonic: ϕµk ∈ E [Uk] (k =
1, 2). Moreover if S 6= Tk, ϕ
µ
k(S) = ∅. It follows that ϕ
(
kTk)µ ∈ E1[Uk](Tk)(
(U1, ϕ
µ
1 ), (U2, ϕ
µ
2 )
)
is a 2-cycle for E1. Since ϕ
(
1T1) ⊂ U2 and ϕ
(
2T2) ⊂ U1,
we have U2 ∈ E1[U1](T1) and U1 ∈ E1[U2](T2). If we assume in addition
that E is locally effective, and satisfies the sheaf property, then U1 ∈ E0(S2)
and U2 ∈ E0(S1), so that E0 is not regular. 2
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6 Stability index of strategic game forms
In this section we adopt notations of subsections 2.1 and 1.2. We consider
a game form G = (X1, . . . ,Xn, A, g). The classical effectivity function E
G
β ,
is defined by :
EGβ (S) = {B ∈ P0(A) | ∀yN ∈ XN , ∃xS∈XS : g(xS , ySc)∈ B} (31)
Clearly EGβ is an effectivity function (see subsection 2.2). Actually E
G
β is
the (global) effectivity function derived from EGβ (see subsections 2.1, and
equation 21). The α-effectivity function is defined by:
EGα (S) = {B ∈ P0(A) | B
c /∈ EGβ (S)} (32)
It is easy to see that EGβ is maximal, that E
G
α is superadditive (hence reg-
ular). Moreover EGβ is monotonic (definition 5.13). G is said to be tight if
EGα = E
G
β . G is tight if and only if E
G
α is maximal or equivalently if E
G
β
regular.
In what follows for r ≥ 1, (EGβ )r is denoted simply E
G
r , similarly if F
is a federation (EGβ )F will be denoted E
G
F
. For the sake of consistency in
our notation and vocabulary, we shall denote by CF(G,RN ), and we shall
call the F-core of G at RN , the set ∩M∈FEO(G,RN ). In summary, while
equilibria have to do with some ACS and the projection of EGβ on that ACS,
the cores have to do with some federation and the restriction of EGβ on that
federation. Note that E0 in the preceding section corresponds to E
G
β in the
present section.
Definition 6.1 Let M be an ACS. The M-stability index of G is the sta-
bility index of EGβ (M). It will be denoted σ(G,M). Similarly if F is a
federation, the F-core stability index of G is the stability index of EG
F
. It will
be denoted by σ(G,F).
Stability index of EG0 (that is the stability index of G relative to the β-core)
and the stability index of EG1 (that is the stability index of G relative to the
local core) have been the object of [5] (Theorem 4.9 and Theorem 4.15). We
start by recalling the result for the β-core:
Theorem 6.2 Let G be a game form. Let σ0 be its index for the β-core
solution. Then:
(i) σ0 = 2 if and only if G is not tight,
(ii) σ0 = 3 if G is tight but E
G
β is not subadditive
(iii) σ0 = +∞ if G is tight and E
G
β subadditive.
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In the rest of this section we shall establish some facts about the stability
index for the major equilibrium concepts namely Nash and strong Nash
equilibrium. For strong solvability we have the following:
Theorem 6.3 (i) If G is strongly solvable then G is tight, EGβ is superad-
ditive and subadditive and EGβ is fully exact.
(ii) If n = 2 then G is strongly solvable if and only if EGβ is regular and E
G
β
is 2-exact.
Proof. EGβ is maximal so that this result is a straightforward consequence of
theorem 5.10. 2
Remark 6.4 In [4] example 2.3, a 2-player game form is given such that
Stl(EG1 , RN ) 6= Stl(E
G
0 , RN ) ≡ C(E
G
β , RN ). In example 2.4, a 2-player game
form is given such that Stl(EG2 , RN ) 6= Stl(E
G
1 , RN ), and in example 2.5 a
3-player game form is given where Stl(EG2 , RN ) is strictly larger than the
corresponding strong outcome set denoted SEO(G,RN ). It would be inter-
esting to exhibit an example of an n-player game form (where necessarily
n ≥ 3) such that G is strongly solvable and SEO(G,RN ) ≡ Stl(E
G
β , RN ) 6=
Stl(EGn , RN ) for some RN . By Theorem 6.3 this is equivalent to find G such
that G is strongly solvable and SEO(G,RN ) 6= C(E
G
β , RN ) for some RN .
In case of strong Nash instability, we can determine upper bounds for the
strong Nash index.
Theorem 6.5 Let G be a game form. Let σ be its index for strong Nash
Equilibrium then:
(i) σ = 2 if and only if G is not tight,
(ii) σ = 3 if G is tight but EGβ is not subadditive,
(iii) σ ≤ r + 2 if EGβ is not r-exact (1 ≤ r ≤ n).
Proof. The result is a straightforward consequence of theorem 5.12 and the
remark that the interaction form EGβ is monotonic and in case of tightness
it is superadditive. 2
In case of bipolarity one has the following corollary of theorem 5.15:
Corollary 6.6 Let G be a strategic game form. If the index is 2 for some
M-equilibrium concept, where ∅ 6=M⊂ P0(N), then the β-effectivity func-
tion of G has index 2, that is the game form is not tight.
Proof. EGβ is a standard monotonic interaction form. Therefore the result
follows from Theorem 5.15. 2
Now we give a localization of the index for some classes of games, that can
be obtained as corollaries from known results in the literature.
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Theorem 6.7 The Nash stability index of a two-player game form is either
2 or +∞
This is a corollary of the fact that for these game forms Nash solvability is
equivalent to tightness. (See Gurvich [9, 11] or Abdou [2]). If we consider
the class of rectangular game forms i.e. such that for any a ∈ A, g−1(a) =∏n
i=1 Yi, for some Yi ⊂ Xi, (i = 1, . . . , n) (Gurvich [10] and Abdou [2, 3])
one has a similar characterization for Nash solvability by tightness. However
it does not follow that the Nash stability index of a rectangular game form
is 2 in case of Nash instability. The only property that can be asserted in
this case is that the β-core index of such a game form is 2. The strong Nash
index for rectangular game forms has a simple characterization:
Theorem 6.8 The strong Nash index of any rectangular game form is ei-
ther 2 or 3 or +∞.
Proof: In view of theorem 4.7 of Abdou [4] any rectangular game form G
such that EGβ is 1-exact is essentially a one-player game form. It follows that
a rectangular game form is strongly solvable if and only if it is 1-exact and
in this case the strong Nash index is +∞. If G is not strongly solvable, EGβ
is not 1-exact, then by theorem 6.5 (iii) the index is less than 1+2 = 3, and
in fact is equal 3 if G is tight (that is Nash solvable). 2
We end this section by presenting some details about the interaction forms
for two examples presented earlier.
Example 6.9 Take the Majority game form of example 2.3. One can ob-
serve that G is tight and 3-exact. However it is not subadditive. Therefore
the effectivity function EGβ is not stable so that the β-core index of G is 3.
The universal interaction form of this game, namely EGβ ≡ E
G
β (P0(N)) has
index 3 too: if EGβ had some cycle of order 2, it would give rise to some cycle
of order 2 for EGβ . Therefore the strong Nash index of G is 3.
Example 6.10 Take the Unanimity game form of example 2.4. Then EGα [a]
and Eβ[a] have been determined for any a ∈ X. Here we shall determine
EGα (M)[0] and Eβ(M)[0] where M is in the class M of admissible ACS. Let
M = {Sk : k = 1, . . . , r} (r ≥ 1) be an admissible ACS. We associate to M
the sets:
∆n := {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X
n | x1 = · · · = xn} (33)
M1 = {S ∈M | |S
c| = 1} (34)
J(M) = {i | N \ {i} ∈ M1} (35)
Γ0(M) := {ϕ | 0 ∈ ρM(ϕ)} (36)
Ψ(M) := {ϕ | ∃S ∈M : ϕ(S) = X} (37)
Λ(M) = {ϕ | ∃a ∈ X,∀S ∈M : ϕ(S) = X \ {a}} (38)
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We first treat the case whereM∗ = {Sc1, . . . , S
c
r} is a partition of N , that is
∩S∈MS = ∅. In particular r ≥ 2.
Claim: Eα(M)[0] ≡ E
G
α (M)[0] and E
G
β (M)[0] ≡ Eβ(M)[0] are given by the
following:
If M1 =M :
Eα(M)[0] = {ψ ∈ Φ | ∃x ∈ X
n \∆,∀i ∈ N : {0, xi} ⊂ ψ(N \ {i})} (39)
Eβ(M)[0] = Γ0(M) ∪Ψ(M1) ∪ Λ(M) (40)
If M1 6=M :
Eα(M)[0] = {ψ | ∀S ∈M : 0 ∈ ψ(S) and ∀S ∈M1 : |ψ(S)| ≥ 2} (41)
Eβ(M)[0] = Γ0(M) ∪Ψ(M1) (42)
Proof of the claim. The formula for Eα(M)[0] is straightforward. Let ϕ ∈ Φ
such that ρM(ϕ) ⊂ X. Then if M1 =M, we have J(M) = N and :
ϕ /∈ Eβ(M)[0] ⇔ ϕ
∗ ∈ Eα(M)[0] (43)
⇔ ∃x ∈ Xn \∆n,∀i ∈ J(M), xi ∈ ϕ
∗(N \ {i} (44)
⇔
∏
i∈N
(X \ ϕ(N \ {i})) ∩ (Xn \∆n) 6= ∅ (45)
It follows that when ϕ is not in Γ0(M), ϕ is in Eβ(M)[0] if and only if∏
i∈N (X \ ϕ(N \ {i})) ⊂ ∆n. Then either
∏
i∈N (X \ ϕ(N \ {i})) is empty
and ϕ ∈ Ψ(M) or there exists a ∈ X, such that X \ ϕ(N \ {i} = {a} for all
i ∈ N and ϕ is in Λ(M).
WhenM1 6=M, we have J(M) 6= N , so that the RHS of formula (45) is
replaced by
∏
i∈J(M)(X \ϕ(N \{i}))∩X
J(M) 6= ∅. It follows that when ϕ is
not in Γ0(M), ϕ is in Eβ(M)[0] if and only if
∏
i∈J(M)(X \ϕ(N \ {i})) = ∅,
so that we conclude that ϕ is in Ψ(M1). Remark that when M1 is empty,
so is Ψ(M1). 2
IfM∗ is not a partition of N , then let S0 = ∪
r
kS
c
k. PutM
′ =M∪{S0}.
Eβ(M)[0] is then calculated as the projection of Eβ(M
′)[0] on M. One
obtains the general formula whether M∗ is a partition or not:
Proposition 6.11 For any M ∈ M, M 6= {N} one has :
Eβ(M)[0] = Γ0 ∪Ψ(M1), if 0 ≤ |M1| < n.
= Γ0(M) ∪Ψ(M1) ∪ Λ(M) if |M1| = n
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In particular taking M = {S}, where S ∈ P0(N) S 6= N , we can deduce:
Eβ(S) = {B ∈ P0(A) | 0 ∈ B} if 1 ≤ |S| ≤ n− 2
= {B ∈ P0(A) | 0 ∈ B} ∪ {X} if |S| = n− 1
= P0(A) if S = N
In order to study exactness we need E0(M) ≡ Eβ(M)[A]∩ {ϕ | ρM(ϕ 6= A}
and Eξ(M) . They are given by the following:
E0(M) = Γ0(M) ∪Ψ(M1) ∩ {ϕ | ρM(ϕ 6= A} (46)
Eξ(M) = Eβ(M)[0] ∩ {ϕ | ρM(ϕ) 6= A} (47)
By writing the intersection of these sets with D(M), one sees that Eβ is
M-exact for any M ∈ M or equivalently Eβ is fully exact. However note
that since X ∈ Eβ(S) and {0} ∈ Eβ(S
c) if |S| = n− 1, it follows that Eβ is
not regular; we conclude that the β-core index and consequently the strong
Nash index of a the unanimity game is 2.
7 Concluding remarks
The model of interaction form as a description of power distribution of a
set of agents N over a set of alternatives A encompasses aspects of both
cooperative and strategic models. The settlement set defined at a preference
profile reflects the outcomes that may emerge given the power system. Any
game form in the context of a classical solution (equilibrium concept or
core) gives rise to some interaction form. Interactive forms defined on the
same sets of agents and alternatives can be compared with each other. In
particular they can be compared with respect to their stability, a main issue
in political science and social choice. Stability is proven to be equivalent to
acyclicity. Solvability of strategic game forms is thus reduced to absence of
cycles. In order to describe the properties of unstable interaction forms, we
introduced a graded notion of exactness. A failure of exactness of some order
for a maximal interaction form is a sign of the existence of some cycle. We
can thus localize the stability index in many cases. Many questions about
the stability index are still open. Moreover a finer analysis of the structure
of instability requires the definition of a typology of cycles that goes beyond
the notion of index.
References
[1] Abdou, J., 1982. Stabilite´ de la fonction veto, Cas du veto maximal.
Math. Sci. Hum. 80, 39-63.
[2] Abdou, J., 1995. Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms.
Int. J. Game Theory 24, 345-356.
32
[3] Abdou, J., 1998. Rectangularity and tightness: a normal form charac-
terization of perfect information extensive game forms. Math. of oper.
research 23, No 3, 553-567.
[4] Abdou, J., 2000. Exact stability and its applications to strong solvabil-
ity. Math. Social Sciences 39, 263 - 275.
[5] Abdou,J., 2009. A stability index for local effectivity functions.
[6] Abdou, J. and Keiding H., 1991. Effectivity functions in social choice.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
[7] Abdou, J. and Keiding H., 2003. On necessary and sufficient conditions
for solvability of game forms. Math. Social Sciences 46, 243 - 260.
[8] Greenberg, J. 1990. The Theory of Social Situations: An Alternative
Game-Theoretic Approach, Cambridge University Press.
[9] Gurvich, V.A., 1975. Solvability in pure strategies. Zh. Vychisl. Mat.
i Mat. Fiz. 15, 358-371; English transl. in USSR Comput. Math. and
Math. Phys. 15.
[10] Gurvich, V.A., 1978. Application of Boolean functions and contact
schemes in game theory. Candidate’s dissertation Moskow, Fiz-Tekn.
Inst. Russian.
[11] Gurvich, V.A., 1989. Equilibrium in pure strategies. Soviet Math. Dokl.
38, 597-602.
[12] Keiding, H., 1985. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of
effectivity functions, Int. J. Game Theory 14, 93 - 101.
[13] Moulin, H. and Peleg, B., 1982. Cores of effectivity functions and im-
plementation theory. J. Math. Econ. 10, 115-162.
Nakamura, K. (1979), The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal pref-
erences, Int. J. Game Theory 8, issue 1, 55-61
[14] Peleg, B., 1984. Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees. Cam-
bridge University Press, Gambridge.
[15] Peleg, B., 1998. Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights.
Social Choice and Welfare 15: 67–80.
[16] Peleg, B., 2004. Representation of Effectivity functions by acceptable
game forms: a complete characterization. Mathematical Social Sciences
47, 275–287.
33
[17] Peleg, B. and Peters, H., 2008. Nash consistent representations of ef-
fectivity functions through lottery models. Forthcoming in Games and
Economic Behavior .
[18] Peleg, B. and Winter, E., 2002. Constitutional implementation. Review
of Economic Design 7, 187–204.
[19] Rosenthal, R.W., 1972. Cooperative games in effectiveness form, J.
Econ. Theory 5 88101.
[20] Vannucci, S., 2002. Effectivity Functions and Stable Governance Struc-
tures. Annals of Operations Research 109, 99127.
[21] Vannucci, S., 2008. A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable gov-
ernment forms with umpires. Rev. Econ. Design 12:3344.
34
